Inspector
Cloudron community app transparency reports
Inspect a Cloudron community app `CloudronVersions.json` feed. Repository analysis is derived from the package metadata in that feed, and the report stays intentionally conservative: it surfaces what the package appears to do, but it does not certify safety.
What this checks
CHECKS EXPLAINED
Checks Explained
Metadata links and missing fields
Reads the Cloudron feed metadata, checks whether important links are valid, and notes when required fields are missing.
Dockerfile command patterns
Scans Docker build steps for risky commands such as destructive deletes, world-writable permissions, or remote scripts piped into a shell.
Runtime shell network calls
Looks through startup shell scripts for commands like curl, wget, nc, or ssh that may contact remote systems during runtime.
Privilege escalation and credential leakage
Flags startup-script patterns that touch privileged system paths, invoke sudo, or combine secrets with outbound commands.
Feed vs repo version drift
Compares the version published in CloudronVersions.json with the version found in the package repository when that repository can be identified reliably.
- Metadata links and missing fields
- Dockerfile command patterns
- Runtime shell network calls
- Privilege escalation and credential leakage
- Feed vs repo version drift
Example inputs
https://communityapps.appx.uk/cloudron-notediscovery/CloudronVersions.json
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BrutalBirdie/cloudron-tachyon-app/refs/heads/master/CloudronVersions.json
https://communityapps.appx.uk/cloudron-ocular/CloudronVersions.json
Generated Report
DbGate
SQL and NoSQL client for the databases behind your apps
Score
60/100
60 reached40 still requires deeper inspection
Automated checks can score at most 70/100. The remaining 30 points require deep inspection.
This tool is for informational purposes only. Use at your own risk.
Safety Flags
1
Fail
1
Unsure
8
Pass
Master Info
packageUrl
Not available
Website link
Repository
Not available
Packager
OrcVole
packagerUrl
minBox
9.1.0
Version
1.0.3
Tags
databasesqladminpostgresqlmysqlmongodb
Detailed Checklist
packageUrl link is present and well formed when required (7/7)
pass
No `packageUrl` declared. This is valid for packages targeting minBoxVersion below 10.
Website link is present and well formed (7/7)
pass
https://www.dbgate.io/
Metadata and README links avoid insecure HTTP (7/7)
pass
No HTTP links found.
Metadata and README links avoid URL shorteners (7/7)
pass
No shortener links found.
Cloudron feed version matches the repository manifest (7/7)
pass
Feed and repo both report 1.0.3.
Repository content was fetched for static analysis (7/7)
pass
https://github.com/OrcVole/dbgate-cloudron @ e0cb40865c6b22378d25c37502885502212ea349
Dockerfile scan did not detect clearly suspicious commands (7/7)
pass
No Dockerfile red flags found.
Runtime shell scripts avoid suspicious outbound network calls (4/7)
unsure
test/secret-scan.sh:227 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/secret-scan.sh:228 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/secret-scan.sh:229 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/secret-scan.sh:232 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/secret-scan.sh:243 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/secret-scan.sh:248 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/smoke.sh:54 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/smoke.sh:75 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/smoke.sh:81 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
test/smoke.sh:85 Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
Runtime shell scripts avoid privilege escalation patterns (0/7)
fail
test/secret-scan.sh:156 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
test/secret-scan.sh:227 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
test/secret-scan.sh:228 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
test/secret-scan.sh:229 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
test/secret-scan.sh:232 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
test/secret-scan.sh:257 Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
Runtime shell scripts avoid credential leakage patterns (7/7)
pass
No credential leakage patterns found in scanned shell scripts.
Raw Findings
Flagged lines are highlighted directly in the code snippet.
16 findings
test/secret-scan.sh:156
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
154 # it does not ship is simply absent. Only then are the container-side hits for these exact paths155 # dropped, and only for these exact paths, in the same spirit as the pinned SSH keys below.156 RUNTIME_PATHS=(/etc/hosts /etc/resolv.conf /etc/hostname)157 RUNFLAGS=(--network=none) # no DNS/hosts wiring either engine can avoid158 [[ "$CRI" == *podman* ]] && RUNFLAGS+=(--no-hosts) # podman only; docker always injects
test/secret-scan.sh:227
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
225 # hashes whenever the base image digest changes.226 declare -A PINNED_SSH=(227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85
test/secret-scan.sh:227
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
225 # hashes whenever the base image digest changes.226 declare -A PINNED_SSH=(227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85
test/secret-scan.sh:228
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
226 declare -A PINNED_SSH=(227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85230 )
test/secret-scan.sh:228
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
226 declare -A PINNED_SSH=(227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85230 )
test/secret-scan.sh:229
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85230 )231 ssh_listing="$("$CRI" run --rm --user 0 "${RUNFLAGS[@]}" --entrypoint /bin/bash "$IMAGE" \
test/secret-scan.sh:229
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
227 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key]=677458f83d985da3fd7cdd208e90e4eac09da5be205425a5f96a6242dc985c33228 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key]=0c575ce8d9ba487b05cc473fad4b0650fb950181028e6ac19796f86f56f22a7a229 [/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key]=ae0ea8087e90baf138d277ca52b6cf47b5010adc0e5bd84236713eee1b85de85230 )231 ssh_listing="$("$CRI" run --rm --user 0 "${RUNFLAGS[@]}" --entrypoint /bin/bash "$IMAGE" \
test/secret-scan.sh:232
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
230 )231 ssh_listing="$("$CRI" run --rm --user 0 "${RUNFLAGS[@]}" --entrypoint /bin/bash "$IMAGE" \232 -c 'for f in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key; do [ -e "$f" ] && sha256sum "$f"; done' 2>/dev/null)"233 found=0; pinned_ok=0234 while IFS= read -r line; do
test/secret-scan.sh:232
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
230 )231 ssh_listing="$("$CRI" run --rm --user 0 "${RUNFLAGS[@]}" --entrypoint /bin/bash "$IMAGE" \232 -c 'for f in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key; do [ -e "$f" ] && sha256sum "$f"; done' 2>/dev/null)"233 found=0; pinned_ok=0234 while IFS= read -r line; do
test/secret-scan.sh:243
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
241 shp="$(printf '%s\n' "$shp" | grep -vF "$f:" || true)" # drop ONLY this verified exact path242 else243 emit ssh-key "$f sha256=$h is NOT a pinned base host key (new, changed or extra: treat as a leak)"244 fi245 done <<< "$ssh_listing"
test/secret-scan.sh:248
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
246 echo " host keys: $found found, $pinned_ok pinned-ok, ${#PINNED_SSH[@]} expected"247 [[ "$found" -eq "${#PINNED_SSH[@]}" && "$pinned_ok" -eq "${#PINNED_SSH[@]}" ]] \248 || emit ssh-key "host key count mismatch: $found found, $pinned_ok pinned-ok, ${#PINNED_SSH[@]} expected"249250 # DISTRO-GENERATED PLACEHOLDER KEYS. Some Debian packages mint a self-signed key in their
test/secret-scan.sh:257
high
Privileged command or direct system-path modification detected in startup script.
255 # Nothing else is exempt: a key at any other path is still a finding, including a second key in256 # the same directory. Add a path here only after confirming the package does not reference it.257 PLACEHOLDER_KEYS=(/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key /etc/prosody/certs/localhost.key)258 for k in "${PLACEHOLDER_KEYS[@]}"; do259 if printf '%s' "$shp" | grep -qF "$k:"; then
test/smoke.sh:54
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
5253 echo "=== waiting for readiness (retry-all-errors: rootless port forwarder resets before the app listens, gotcha #117) ==="54 if ! curl -fsS --retry 30 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 1 "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health" >/dev/null; then55 echo " FAIL: app never became ready"56 "$CRI" logs "$name" | tail -60
test/smoke.sh:75
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
7374 local health_code75 health_code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health")"76 assert "[${scenario}] /health returns 200 unauthenticated (got: ${health_code})" $([[ "$health_code" == "200" ]]; echo $?)77
test/smoke.sh:81
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
79 # the fact so a future edit expecting it to gate auth fails loudly instead of silently.80 local root_code81 root_code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/")"82 assert "[${scenario}] GET / is 200 regardless of auth state, by design (got: ${root_code})" $([[ "$root_code" == "200" ]]; echo $?)83
test/smoke.sh:85
medium
Network-capable command found in a runtime shell script.
8384 local rpc_code85 rpc_code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/connections/list" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}')"86 assert "[${scenario}] unauthenticated RPC call is fenced, not 200 (got: ${rpc_code})" $([[ "$rpc_code" != "200" ]]; echo $?)87
